Cooperative game theory concepts that address relative power of the riparian states in capturing incremental benefits from cooperation, such as the Core, the Shapley Value, and the Nash-Harsanyi (N-H) solution are compared under several scenarios, namely with and without water trade, and with and without existence of unidirectional externalities in the form of soil erosion and siltation impact. We find that the stability of Shapley and N-H benefits allocations are sensitive to the initial water rights allocation, which may explain the present caution of the basin states to be engaged in cooperation arrangements. We also find that when a Core exists it is very small, which indicates also a fragile basis for cooperation. This study examines management approaches for hydropower generation and irrigation and domestic water supply for the Tekeze-Atbara, a transboundary river between Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan, in above- and below-normal hydrologic conditions, considering current and future water demand scenarios.
The current literature mainly describes what is meant by the term benefit sharing in the the context of transboundary river basins and discusses this from a conceptual point of view, but falls short of providing practical, institutional arrangements that ensure maximum economic welfare as well as collaboratively developed methods for encouraging the equitable sharing of benefits. In this study we define an institutional arrangement that distributes welfare in a river basin by maximizing the economic benefits of water use and then sharing these benefits in an equitable manner using a method developed through stakeholder involvement.We describe a methodology in which (i) a hydrological model is used to allocate scarce water resources, in an economically efficient manner, to water users in a transboundary basin, (ii) water users are obliged to pay for water, and (iii) the total of these water charges are equitably redistributed as monetary compensation to users in an amount determined through the application of a sharing method developed by stakeholder input, thus based on a stakeholder vision of fairness, using an axiomatic approach. The whole system is overseen by a river basin authority. The methodology is applied to the Eastern Nile River basin as a case study. The described technique not only ensures economic efficiency, but may also lead to more equitable solutions in the sharing of benefits in transboundary river basins because the definition of the sharing rule is not in question, as would be the case if existing methods, such as game theory, were applied, with their inherent definitions of fairness.
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The equitable sharing of benefits in transboundary river basins is necessary to solve disputes among riparian countries and to reach a consensus on basin-wide development and management activities. Benefit-sharing arrangements must be collaboratively developed to be perceived not only as efficient, but also as equitable in order to be considered acceptable to all riparian countries. The current literature mainly describes what is meant by the term benefit sharing in the context of transboundary river basins and discusses this from a conceptual point of view, but falls short of providing practical, institutional arrangements that ensure maximum economic welfare as well as collaboratively developed methods for encouraging the equitable sharing of benefits. In this study, we define an institutional arrangement that distributes welfare in a river basin by maximizing the economic benefits of water use and then sharing these benefits in an equitable manner using a method developed through stakeholder involvement. We describe a methodology in which (i) a hydrological model is used to allocate scarce water resources, in an economically efficient manner, to water users in a transboundary basin, (ii) water users are obliged to pay for water, and (iii) the total of these water charges is equitably redistributed as monetary compensation to users in an amount determined through the application of a sharing method developed by stakeholder input, thus based on a stakeholder vision of fairness, using an axiomatic approach.
The case study is the addition of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and considers how its operation may be coordinated with adaptations to the operations of Egypt’s High Aswan Dam. The results demonstrate that a lack of coordination is likely to be harmful to downstream riparians and suggest that adaptations to infrastructure in Sudan and Egypt can reduce risks to water supplies and energy generation. Although risks can be substantially reduced by agreed releases from the GERD and basic adaptations to the High Aswan Dam, these measures are still insufficient to assure that no additional risk is assumed by Egypt. The method then demonstrates how improvements to water security for both downstream riparians can be achieved through dynamic adaptation of the operation of the GERD during drought conditions. Finally, the paper demonstrates how the robustness of potential management arrangements can be evaluated considering potential effects of climate change, including increased interannual variability and highly uncertain changes such as increases in the future persistence of droughts.
Arjoon et al. (2014) , Tilmant and Kinzelbach 38 (2012) and Whittington et al. (2005) assessed the value of cooperation in international river basins 39 and found that there are significant gains from basin-wide cooperation. The equity issue of sharing 40 benefits from cooperation has been addressed by game theory (Teasley and McKinney 2011;Wu 41 and Whittington 2006) and an approach based on a stakeholder vision of fairness ( Arjoon et al. 42 2016).
Section B – Technology, Operation and Environment ( back )
Although some of these studies discuss the operation and filling of possible reservoirs, they use either simplified or idealized reservoir operations. Arjoon et al. 2014; Kahsay et al. 2015).
Improved coordination requires sharing information, demanding a clear understanding of the potential gains and its distribution among the users to motivate engagement in coordinated operations and bearing of transaction costs. In a multiuser, multireservoir system, the evaluation of the potential coordination gains is not trivial because it requires the simultaneous evaluation of numerous trade offs.
We believe that a serious discourse among Nile riparians about the economics of Nile cooperation is both inevitable and desirable, and that this discourse will not diminish the importance of environmental, social, or cultural issues that new infrastructure on the Nile will entail. To initiate such a discussion, in this paper we present the results of the first economic model designed to optimize the water resources of the entire Nile basin. Total (potential) annual direct gross economic benefits of Nile water utilization in irrigation and hydroelectric power generation are estimated to be on the order of US$7-11 billion. This does not account for the costs of building or operating the infrastructure. The aim of this article is to identify where and how power relations in the Nile river basin have changed over the past decade, and to analyse how these dynamics have influenced not only the political relations between upstream and downstream riparians but also the management and allocation of the shared Nile water resources.
- However, to date there has been virtually no explicit discussion of the economic value of cooperative water resources development.
- Gains from cooperation will mean little to individual riparians unless the required cooperative behaviors are incentive compatible.
- A sensitivity analysis is performed by testing model response to a range of economic conditions and to changes in the volume and timing of hydrologic flows.
- This paper reviews river basin water resource models as applied in the Nile River Basin, distinguishing between simulation, optimization and combined simulation and optimization models.
Satellite data are used to substitute for unavailable or inaccessible ground meteorological and dam data. Based on three examined coordination scenarios, the analysis finds that coordinating the management of the Sudanese dams would bring significant benefits to water supply and energy generation. An optimization analysis is necessary to reveal the full value of coordination of dams in the Tekeze-Atbara Basin. Increasing water demand coupled with limited water resources has given rise to the need for sustainable water resources development in the Nile River Basin.
evaluated the longterm impacts of the GERD on the economic benefits of Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt and concluded that the GERD would increase the minimum annual economic benefits of the three countries from 4.9 to 5.6 billion US$, provided that Sudan fully uses its water share according to the 1959Nile Water Agreement (UN, 1964 and Ethiopia implements its planned irrigation schemes around Lake Tana. Similarly, Jeuland et al. (2017) examined the long-term impacts of the GERD on Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt and found that by maximizing the overall economic benefit of the three countries, the annual economic benefit to Ethiopia would increase from 253 to 1465 million US$ primarily due to hydroenergy generation, but the annual economic benefit to Sudan would decrease from 1691 to 1595 million US$ as a result of allowing the maximum generation of energy from all Nile dams and promoting downstream agricultural production in Egypt. In October 2017, I was invited to join the Lahmeyer team assigned in the project of the rehabilitation and uprating of Roseires HPP. The Hydropower Plant is located at the Blue Nile river, about 550 km south of Khartoum, close to the city of Ad-Damazin. The dam was constructed between 1961 and 1966.
The theoretical benchmark for basin 516 cooperation in the agricultural and power sector (basin_MS scenario) generates the lowest annual 517 national costs only for Uzbekistan. The â€œNew Roseiresâ€ hydropower plant in Sudan will in the future provide to the country an important expansion in power generation capacity, enough for supplying electricity to thousands of additional homes, as well as public infrastructure (e.g. hospitals). This will significantly increase the quality of living of the Sudanese population.
Irrigation water demands and other operating constraints are imposed on the system through the SDDP model. The pro-posed methodology is illustrated with the Southeastern Anatolia Development project, commonly called GAP, in Turkey. The GAP is a multidimensional development project involving primarily the production of hydroelectricity and irrigation. Simulation results using 50 hydrologic scenarios show that the complete development of the irrigation projects would reduce the total energy output by 6.5%, and will incease the risk of not meeting minimum outflow at the Syrian border from 5% to 25%. Notwithstanding current heavy dependence on gas-fired electricity generation in the Eastern African Power Pool (EAPP), hydropower is expected to play an essential role in improving electricity access in the region.
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Ethiopia is the main source of the Nile River, and the country urgently needs water for irrigation and hydro-electric power development. To-date, however, Ethiopia is the country in the Eastern Nile basin that uses the least amount of water from the Nile run-off.
Water scarcity is a global concern, particularly in arid and semi-arid. This fact should be considered in decision making and management of water resources and also policy makers should pay attention to the effects of these policies as a crucial criterion. This study was carried out to investigate the effect of different policies of agricultural products marketing network reform on water resources management, especially on the use of groundwater in the Neyshabur basin in Iran. Thus, taking into account the effects of marketing on the supply and demand water, we used hydro-economic (H-E) model.